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updates from international and
internationalized criminal courts & tribunals
International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia
On March 17, 2009, the Appeals Chamber sentenced Momčilo Krajišnik, a Bosnian Serb leader, to 20 years imprisonment,
upholding earlier guilty verdicts on charges
of deportation, forcible transfer, and persecution of non-Serb civilians committed during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Trial Chamber found that Krajišnik
participated in a joint criminal enterprise
to alter the ethnic composition of the territories under the control of the BosnianSerb Republic by drastically reducing the
proportion of non-Serbs. However, with
respect to the expanded crimes of murder,
extermination and persecution (other than
those based on deportation and forcible
transfer), the Appeals Chamber held that
the Trial Chamber failed to identify when
those acts became part of the common goal
of the joint criminal enterprise and made
only scarce findings, if any. It, therefore,
quashed Krajišnik’s convictions for these
expanded crimes.
On February 26, 2009, five senior Yugoslav and Serb officials were convicted
of crimes against humanity directed at
the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo,
committed in early 1999. Former Yugoslav
Deputy Prime Minister, Nikola Šainović,
Yugoslav Army General, Nebojša Pavković
and Serbian Police General Sreten Lukić
were each sentenced to 22 years imprisonment for crimes against humanity and
violation of the laws or customs of war.
The court held that Šainović, as “one of
the closest and most trusted associates
of Milošević” was “one of the most crucial members” of the joint criminal enterprise. Yugoslav Army General, Vladimir
Lazarević and Chief of the General Staff,
Dragoljub Ojdanić were found guilty of
aiding and abetting the commission of a
number of charges of deportation and forcible transfer of the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo and were each sentenced to
15 years imprisonment. However, Milan
Milutinović, the former President of Serbia, was acquitted of all charges because
the Prosecution failed to prove that he had
made a significant contribution to the joint
criminal enterprise, or that he had actual

control over the actions of the military
forces in Kosovo. The presiding judge, Iain
Bonomy, recognized that these actions had
caused the departure of at least 700,000
Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo between
March and June of 1999.
This trial was one of the Tribunal’s
largest and most complex, with trial proceedings that began on July 10, 2006, and
concluded on 27 August 2008. Since its
establishment, the Tribunal has indicted
161 persons for serious violations of
humanitarian law committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia between
1991 and 2001 and proceedings against
116 have been concluded.

The War Crimes Chamber
Court of Bosnia and
Herzegovina

of the

The Special Department for War
Crimes, in the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has issued numerous indictments
thus far in 2009. Blagoje Golubović was
indicted as a member of the military of the
Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
subsequently the Republika Srpska, which
directed attacks against non-Serb civilians
of the Foća Municipality. As a member
of the forces, he participated in a plan to
accomplish the common goal of executing non-Serbs in the village of Podkolun
in the Foća Municipality. He and others,
armed with automatic weapons, separated
themselves from the group to enter the
village where they shot and killed victims.
The Court charged him with knowingly
and deliberately participating in a joint
criminal enterprise and committing crimes
against humanity.
Other members of the Republika Srpska
indicted earlier this year include Damir
Ivanković, Zoran Babić, Gordan Durić,
Milorad Radaković, and Dušan Janković.
Along with numerous others, these men
were indicted on charges of a joint criminal
enterprise to persecute and commit crimes
against Bosniaks and Croats on political,
ethnic, and religious grounds. Their crimes
include deliberate deprivation of life, forcible transfer of population, and inhumane
treatment. Additionally, Janković was
47

charged with command responsibility, as a
superior who failed to undertake necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent the
commission of the previously mentioned
crimes.
The Appellate Division of the Court of
Bosnia and Herzegovina upheld a judgment against Željko Lelek on January 12,
2009. Lelek was sentenced to 16 years of
imprisonment for crimes against humanity
after the Appellate Division dismissed his
appeal as unfounded. He was tried for his
role persecuting the Bosniak civilian population in the Višegrad Municipality through
severe deprivation of physical liberty,
unlawful imprisonment, torture, rape, and
other forms of sexual violence. The court
upheld the judgment against Lelek finding
that the evidence was used in a methodical
way and facts were supported by underlying
evidence in accordance with the “beyond
the reasonable doubt” standard.
Two other accused who appealed their
judgments were Mirko Todorović and Miloš
Radić. Their sentences to 17 years imprisonment by the Trial Panel, were revised
to 13 and 12 years respectively by the
Appellate Panel. Both Todorović and Radić
helped a group of soldiers by giving information and guidance to find and capture a
group of Bosniak civilians, after which the
soldiers tortured and murdered them. The
Appellate Panel considered extenuating
circumstances including that the accused
had no convictions since the commission
of the offense and that they are married
with three children each. Therefore, their
sentences as accessories to the commission of the crime of persecution were
revised and their sentences reduced. Both
men addressed the Appellate Chamber and
expressed remorse, claiming to have suffered as silent observers to crimes committed against their respected neighbors.

International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda
The Prosecutor v. Simon Bikindi,
ICTR-01-72
Trial Chamber III of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda issued a

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 9
judgment in the case against Simon Bikindi,
a Rwandan citizen, on December 2, 2008.
The Chamber found Bikindi guilty on only
one of six counts charged under Article 2
and 3 of the ICTR Statute, namely, direct
and public incitement to commit genocide. The Chamber acquitted Bikindi on
charges of conspiracy to commit genocide,
complicity in genocide, murder as a crime
against humanity, and persecution as a
crime against humanity. He was sentenced
to fifteen years in prison.
When the genocide began in 1994,
Bikindi was a composer, a singer, and an
active member of the Ministry of Youth and
Association Movements of the government
of Rwanda. In particular, he was the director of the Irindiro Ballet, most of whose
members ultimately joined the Intera
hamwe and participated in the genocide.
The Prosecution alleged that after President Habyarimana’s death in 1994, Bikindi
participated in the systematic and violent
campaign waged against the Tutsis through
his musical compositions and speeches at
public gatherings, which incited and promoted hatred. Furthermore, the Prosecution
sought to prove that Bikindi collaborated
with government figures and leaders of the
genocide—the Mouvement Revolutionaire
Natinale pour le Developpement (MRND),
the Interahamwe, the Coalition for the
Defence of the Republic (CDR), and the
Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines
(RTLM) radio station—to spread anti-Tutsi
ideology. Finally, the Prosecution alleged
that Bikindi trained the Interahamwe and
was personally responsible for specific
attacks and killings in Gisenyi because of
his direct participation and his command
over the Interahamwe members of the
Irindiro ballet.
The Defense contended that Bikindi
was merely a musician, not a political man,
and has no intention or ability—through
his own authority or by way of influence—
to incite discrimination or violence against
Tutsi with his music. In the presentation
of its case, the Defense focused primarily
on the lack of reliable evidence presented
by the Prosecution, arguing that it failed
to show authority or influence over any of
the main parties involved in planning and
executing the genocide.
Following the trial the Chamber concluded that, although the Prosecution had
successfully established that Bikindi’s
musical compositions were colored with

a strong anti-Tutsi message, the Prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence
to show that Bikindi intended to incite
participation in the genocide through the
playing of his songs on the RTLM radio
station. Indeed, testimony indicated that
he had no authority over the RTLM’s
programming. Nevertheless, the Chamber
convicted Bikindi on the charge of direct
and public incitement to commit genocide
on the basis of speeches he made through
the public address systems outfitted on
several vehicles he used. The evidence presented satisfied the Chamber that Bikindi
traveled through Giyseni on the main road
in a convoy of Interahamwe, during which
time he broadcast his songs and other antiTutsi songs over a loud speaker attached to
his vehicle and repeatedly insisted that the
Hutu majority exterminate all Tutsi.
The Chamber stressed that, in order for
hate speech to be considered a crime for
the purposes of the ICTR’s jurisdiction, the
speech must be a public and direct appeal
to commit an act of genocide, amounting
to more than a vague or indirect suggestion. It further explained that context is
the principal consideration when determining whether the hate speech amounts to a
crime under the ICTR Statute. Therefore,
in making its decision, the Chamber looked
to the cultural and linguistic environment
in which Bikindi acted, his political and
community affiliation, his audience, and
how that audience specifically understood
his speech. Ultimately, the Chamber found
that Bikindi did incite and promote participation in the genocide and that he intended
to do so. The final comments made on
behalf of this conclusion make manifest
the Chamber’s conviction in its judgment:
Bikindi blatantly and plainly called on “the
majority” to “rise up and look everywhere
possible,” and not to “spare anybody,”
referring immediately to the Tutsi.
As for the remainder of the charges,
the Chamber agreed with the Defense
that the Prosecution had presented insufficient or unconvincing evidence on which
to base a conviction. In summary, the
Chamber decided that the Prosecution did
not prove that Bikindi collaborated with
those alleged to militarize and indoctrinate
the Interahamwe with anti-Tutsi ideology
and to disseminate anti-Tutsi ideology and
propaganda. Furthermore, the Chamber
held that the Prosecution did not prove
that Bikindi participated in recruitment
48

and military training of the Interahamwe.
Finally, although the Chamber did find that
the Prosecution established that Bikindi
was in fact considered to be an important
figure and a man of authority amongst the
Interahamwe, the evidence was not sufficient to hold him liable for the actions of
the Interahamwe under a theory of superior
responsibility.

Francois Karera v. the Prosecutor,
Case No. ICTR- 01-74-A
On February 2, 2009, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) issued its judgment in
the case against Francois Karera. The Trial
Chamber of the ICTR convicted Karera,
who served as the primary Prefect of Kigali
during the 1994 genocide, of genocide and
extermination and murder as crimes against
humanity, sentencing him to life imprisonment. While the Appeals Chamber accepted
three of Karera’s twelve grounds for appeal,
it affirmed the life sentence.
One of Karera’s grounds for appeal
included the claim that the Trial Chamber
generally applied incorrect standards of
law in assessing the accused’s own testimony. Pointing to Canadian case law,
Karera argued that when the presumption
of innocence is at stake, a defendant’s testimony must be assessed pursuant to special
rules which require judges to evaluate the
defendant’s credibility, to state whether
they believe him, and to explain why they
are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of
his guilt despite contradictory evidence in
his testimony. In dismissing this argument,
the Appeals Chamber emphasized that the
ICTR is not bound by any national rules of
evidence or any national case law. In fact,
there is no requirement in the Tribunal’s
jurisprudence that the defendant’s credibility be assessed first nor in isolation from
the rest of the evidence presented.
Karera also argued that the Trial Chamber, as a general matter, erred by erratically
applying the Tribunal’s jurisprudence on
corroboration. In response, the Appeals
Chamber noted that the Trial Chamber
has the discretion to decide, depending on
the circumstances of each case, whether
corroboration of evidence is necessary.
Accordingly, it may rely on uncorroborated, but otherwise credible, witness testimony and may also only use part of a
witness’s testimony in reaching a conclusion if the other parts are insufficient or not
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credible. Therefore, just as the Tribunal is
not bound by national rules or case law, it is
also accorded a relatively substantial level
of discretion as to which rules it does apply
when assessing the credibility of witnesses
and considering testimonies.
Despite the substantial deference given
to the Trial Chamber’s factual findings,
the Appeals Chamber did accept Karera’s
grounds for appeal regarding his responsibility for the murders of three Tutsis:
Joseph Kahabaye, Jean Bosco Ndingutse,
and Palatin Nyagatare. The Appeals Chamber held that no reasonable trier of fact
could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the three individuals were
murdered as a consequence of an order
to kill Tutsis given by Karera. Thus, the
Appeals Chamber reversed the convictions
for ordering genocide and extermination
and murder as crimes against humanity
as far as they related to these three individuals. The Appeals Chamber reversed
Karera’s conviction for instigating murder
as a crime against humanity to the extent
that the conviction was based on the killing of someone referred to as Gakuru on
a similar basis. The remaining ground
of appeal found to be successful by the
Appeals Chamber related to a defect in the
Prosecution’s amended indictment that was
not adequately cured. Ultimately, however,
the Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial
Chamber’s convictions for genocide and
the crimes against humanity of murder and
extermination, based on findings unrelated
to those that the Appeals Chamber found
to be in error.
The Appeals Chamber rejected Karera’s
contention that the Trial Chamber erred
in imposing the sentence of life imprisonment. Karera specifically argued that the
Trial Chamber disregarded important mitigating factors, including the fact that he
had participated in so-called “pacification
meetings,” engaged in efforts to ensure the
safety of a well-known Rwandan Patriotic
Front supporter, and that he was involved
in community development before the start
of the genocide. The Appeals Chamber
rejected this ground of appeal, stating that
Karera merely pointed out facts that would
have been mitigating, but he did not sufficiently establish that the Trial Chamber
undervalued those factors. In affirming
the Trial Chamber’s use of these factors, as
well as its use of the aggravating circumstances, the Appeals Chamber highlighted

once again the level of discretion given to
the Trial Chamber.

Prosecutor v. Bagosora, et al. Case
No. Case No. ICTR-98-41-T
On December 18, 2008, after 409 days
of trial, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda delivered its judgment in
the case of Prosecutor v. Bagosora, et al.,
commonly referred to as the “Military I
Trial.” The Tribunal convicted three of
the four accused for crimes committed
in Rwanda in 1994. These three, Colonel
Théoneste Bagosora (Directeur de Cabinet of the Ministry of Defence), Major
Aloys Ntabakuze (commander of the elite
Para Commando Battalion), and Colonel
Anatole Nsengiyumva (commander of the
Gisenyi operational sector), were found to
have committed several counts of genocide, crimes against humanity (murder,
extermination, rape, persecution and other
inhumane acts) and war crimes (violence
to life and outrages upon personal dignity).
Given their convictions for the genocide,
however, the Tribunal acquitted each on
charges of conspiracy to commit genocide
and the Prosecution agreed to dismiss
charges against the three for complicity
in genocide. Bagosora, Ntabakuze, and
Nsengiyumva were each sentenced to life
in prison. The Tribunal acquitted the fourth
defendant, General Gratien Kabiligi, the
head of the operations bureau (G-3) of the
army general staff, on all counts.
The Prosecution alleged that the four
accused had conspired amongst themselves
and with others from late 1990 through
April 1994 to exterminate the Tutsi population. In response, the Defense disputed the
credibility of the Prosecution’s evidence,
claiming that the Prosecution had drawn
inferences from unproven facts. In addition, the Defense offered alternative explanations for the events which occurred after
President Juvénal Habyarimana’s plane
was shot down on April 6, 1994. While
the Trial Chamber noted that conspiracy
to commit genocide could be established
by way of circumstantial evidence, it also
explained that it could only convict where
conspiracy is beyond a reasonable doubt
the only reasonable inference to be drawn
from the evidence presented.
In this case, the Chamber found that the
Prosecution had failed to meet its burden.
First, the Chamber found that the participa49

tion by Bagosora, Ntabakuze and Nsengiyumva on a 1991 commission established
to identify “the enemy”—determined to
be primarily Tutsi—and that where these
findings were circulated to soldiers in the
Rwandan Army by Ntabakuze in 1992 and
1993. Furthermore, the Chamber found that
Bagosora, Ntabakuze and Nsengiyumva
played a role in the creation, arming, and
training of the Interahamwe militia and the
maintenance of lists of suspected accomplices of the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan
Patriotic Front.
Despite these findings, the Chamber
held that, while the evidence could be construed to support a conspiracy to commit
genocide, the evidence could also prove
plans for a political or military power
struggle. Notwithstanding its finding
against the conspiracy charges, the Trial
Chamber expressly noted that it answered
the question of “whether the Prosecution ha[d] proven beyond reasonable doubt
based on the evidence in this case that
the four Accused committed the crime of
conspiracy,” and “not whether there was
a plan or conspiracy to commit genocide in Rwanda.” The Chamber further
emphasized that the Defense’s “alternative
explanations” about the evidence set forth
on the conspiracy charge did not “raise
doubt about whether a genocide occurred
in Rwanda.”
Regarding the convictions, the Chamber
found Bagosora and Nsengiyumva guilty
of genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes on the basis of conduct for
which they were directly responsible under
Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute and for the
conduct of subordinates based on the theory
of superior responsibility under Article 6(3)
of the Statute. Notably, the Chamber found
that Bagosora was the highest authority
in the Ministry of Defense and exercised
effective control over the Rwandan army
and gendarmerie and that Nsengiyumya
held the highest level of operations authority in Gisenyi prefecture. The Chamber
convicted Ntabakuze of these crimes solely
on the basis of superior responsibility.
Although Kabigili was charged with these
crimes, the Chamber found that he raised
an alibi on those counts for which he was
charged with direct responsibility and that
the Prosecution failed to proved that Kabigili exercised any de jure or de facto command authority.
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Special Court for Sierra Leone
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, & Gbao,
Case No. SCSL-04-15-T
On February 25, 2009, the Trial Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL) convicted former leaders of the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) Issa
Hassan Sesay for 16 counts, Morris Kallon for 16 counts, and Augustine Gbao
for 14 counts of crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and other serious violations
of international humanitarian law. These
counts included: extermination, rape, sexual slavery, and other inhumane acts (forced
marriage) as crimes against humanity; the
war crimes of physical violence, enslavement, terrorism, collective punishment,
outrages upon personal dignity, unlawful killing of civilians, cruel treatment,
and pillaging; and conscription of children
into armed forces and intentional attacks
against humanitarian personnel as other
serious violations of international humanitarian law. Each accused was acquitted on
the charges of murder as a crime against
humanity and the war crime of hostage
taking, and Gbao was found not guilty on
the charges relating to child soldiers and
physical violence. Sesay was sentenced to
fifty-two years imprisonment, Kallon to
thirty-nine years, and Gbao to twenty-six
years.
Initially, the RUF trial involved five
accused: Issa Hassan Sesay, the Interim
Leader of the RUF; Morris Kallon, temporary commander of the RUF; Augustine
Gbao, senior officer and RUF ideology
instructor; Foday Sankoh, one of the founders of the RUF; and Sam Bockarie, leading
member and temporary commander of the
RUF. However, indictments against Sankoh
and Bockarie were withdrawn due to their
deaths.
One notable aspect of the judgment is
that it marks the first time that an international criminal body has convicted an
accused for acts constituting forced marriage. While the SCSL Appeals Chamber had recognized, in the case against
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
(AFRC), that forced marriage could constitute “other inhumane acts” as a crime
against humanity under the SCSL Statute,
separate and distinct from rape or sexual
slavery as crimes against humanity, the
Appeals Chamber did not enter convictions against the AFRC accused for acts of

forced marriage. In the RUF judgment, the
Trial Chamber further expands on the components of forced marriage as the crime
against humanity of other inhumane acts,
saying that it is based on the “accused’s
responsibility for women and girls being
forced into ‘marriages’ and being forced to
perform a number of conjugal duties under
coercion by their ‘husbands.’” The Chamber distinguishes the crime against humanity of rape from that of other inhumane acts
(forced marriage) on the grounds that “the
offence of rape requires sexual penetration, whereas ‘forced marriage’ requires
a forced conjugal association based on
exclusivity between the perpetrator and
victim.” It also distinguishes sexual slavery
from forced marriage, saying the “distinct
elements are a forced conjugal association
based on exclusivity between the perpetrator and victim.”
Another interesting feature of the RUF
judgment is found in the disagreement
between the majority of the Trial Chamber
and Justice Pierre Boutet regarding Gbao’s
criminal responsibility for several of the
alleged crimes. The majority found that
Gbao, like Sesay and Kallon, was responsible for a number of crimes due to his
participation in a joint criminal enterprise
(JCE) that existed between senior leaders
of the RUF, AFRC, and Liberian President Charles Taylor between May 1997,
when a joint RUF-AFRC junta overthrew
the democratically elected government in
Freetown, through April 1998. The purpose
of the JCE, according to the majority, was
to take any action necessary to gain and
exercise political power and control over
the territory of Sierra Leone, in particular
the diamond mining areas. While Justice
Boutet agreed as to the existence of the
RUF-AFRC joint criminal enterprise, he
disagreed that Gbao played a sufficiently
significant role in the enterprise to be
held liable on a theory of JCE liability.
The majority based its findings regarding
Gbao’s participation in the JCE primarily
on the fact that Gbao was the “RUF ideology instructor” and that “ideology played
a significant role in the RUF movement as
it ensured not only the fighters’ submission and compliance with the orders and
instructions of the RUF leadership[,] but
also hardened their determination, their
resolve and their commitment to fight to
ensure the success and achievement of the
ideology of the movement.” By contrast,
Justice Boutet held that, in a “broadly
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pleaded joint criminal enterprise” such as
that alleged by the Prosecution against the
RUF, it is necessary to “require a close connection between the goals of the [JCE] and
the contribution of each of the Accused.” In
Gbao’s case, there was no such close connection, according to Justice Boutet.
Finally, Justice Bankole Thompson wrote
a separate concurring opinion addressing,
inter alia, whether the accused could have
successfully argued that their actions were
justified by the doctrine of just war. Notably, the legitimacy of entering into armed
conflict (jus ad bellum) is not within the
subject matter jurisdiction of the Special
Court, none of the accused affirmatively
raised such a defense, and no international
criminal body has ever held that fighting a “just war” is a valid defense against
war crimes or crimes against humanity.
Nevertheless, Justice Thompson examined
the potential defense and found it lacking.
First, Justice Thompson explained that the
doctrine of just war is rooted in the “right
to rebel against a corrupt and oppressive
civilian government.” Then, he concluded
that because the ideology of the RUF postulated that their actions stemmed from the
will of the people and was an armed liberation campaign against a corrupt government, the RUF’s defense of just war failed
because, among other reasons, there was
no evidence presented to demonstrate that
the RUF exhausted all other non-violent
alternatives, or that the government did any
wrongs to justify rebellion.

The Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia
The First Trial Gets Underway in
the ECCC
On March 30, 2009, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(ECCC) began proceedings in the trial of
Kaing Guek Eav, a.k.a. Duch, a prominent
figure in the Khmer Rouge regime. The
trial is expected to continue through early
July. Duch is being charged with crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and murder
and torture under domestic law based on
his role as the head of S-21, the interrogation and torture center of the Khmer
Rouge regime, also called Tuol Sleng. On
the first day of proceedings, Duch sought
forgiveness in court and apologized for the
atrocities with which he is charged, saying:
“My current plea is that I would like you
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to please leave an open window for me to
seek forgiveness.”
The first witnesses to testify in the
trial have been former prisoners of M-13,
a jungle prison that was the predecessor
of S-21, in order to provide insight into
Duch’s character and background on the
establishment and general operating procedures of S-21. The first such witness was
Francois Bizot, who described Duch as a
man “who was a vector of state-institutionalized massive killing on the one hand, and
on the other hand, a young man who had
committed his life to a cause, to a purpose,
based on the idea that crime was not only
legitimate, it was deserved.” Bizot testified
that it was Duch’s “duty to be the interrogator,” that his “job was to write up reports
on the people sent to him for execution
purposes.” Yet the witness also said that,
although he was interrogated daily, he was
never beaten and Duch always questioned
him “in a polite way.”
The first weeks of the trial proceeded
relatively smoothly. However, the Trial
Chamber faces challenges regarding the
extent of civil party participation, including the processing of some 161 civil party
applications received in February, accurate and timely translations, and protection
measures for witnesses.

Ongoing Challenges at the ECCC
The ECCC continues to struggle with
whether to charge other key members of
the Khmer Rouge, a possibility that Prime
Minister Hun Sen staunchly opposes on
the grounds such a decision would cause
social strife. The issue is currently pending
before the Pre-Trial Chamber, which has
jurisdiction to resolve disputes between the
Co-Prosecutors of the ECCC. Presently,
the international Co-Prosecutor supports
going forward with further investigations,
while the Cambodian Co-Prosecutor is on
record against expanding the number of
accused. One factor that may be relevant
to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision is the
fact that the remaining four accused in the
dock are so sick that there is speculation
they may not make it to trial.
Corruption remains a nagging concern
for the tribunal. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) will not remit
frozen funds until an effective ethics monitoring system has been created to process
allegations of corruption. Despite efforts

to establish such a system between the UN
and the Cambodian side of the tribunal,
no agreement has yet been reached. The
Japanese bailed out the Cambodian side of
the Chambers with an emergency contribution to pay national salaries for the month
of March, which the ECCC had previously
said were not forthcoming due to insolvency. But, there is obvious concern that
the tribunal cannot rely on last minute infusions to float the tribunal through the trials
of the five defendants now in custody. An
attempt by the UN in early April to broker
a deal with the Cambodian government
regarding how to address the corruption
charges was unsuccessful.

With Justice Comes Closure?
In addition to Duch, four more of the
most influential Khmer Rouge leaders sit
in custody to be tried for their involvement in the state sanctioned reign of terror
unleashed on the Cambodian people from
1975 to 1979. The regime is responsible
for some 1.7 million deaths of people who
died of starvation, disease, forced labor,
torture, and execution. Although the ECCC
charges and is prosecuting each defendant for their individual actions under the
regime, there is a sense that by bringing
these five senior leaders to justice, by holding them accountable for their actions, a
nation will be vindicated. Could this court
bring salvation for a nation grappling with
the legacy of the Khmer Rouge?
At the least, the ECCC provides justice
to the actual victims of the accused and
symbolic justice to the people of Cambodia en masse and affords a long awaited
opportunity for closure. Duch’s trial represents an end to impunity. As former S-21
prisoner, Bu Meng, states, “My feeling is
very angry and very happy, mixed. I am
angry that Duch killed my wife. And I am
very happy because the court is trying the
Khmer Rouge leaders. Duch’s trial is very
valuable for humanity around the world,
and for Cambodians, and for me.” Perhaps
the most fundamental consequence of the
tribunal is a burgeoning movement to create a comprehensive outreach program
aimed at educating and promoting discourse amongst a scarred nation—a nation
failed by their government. Cambodians
have come together through faith in justice
to rally behind a cause of social betterment
in their effort to facilitate understanding,
reconciliation, and a new beginning.
51

International Criminal Court
Arrest Warrant Issued for Sudanese
President Omar Hassan al-Bashir
On March 4, 2009, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) issued a warrant for the arrest of
Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, President
of Sudan, based on a finding that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the
president is responsible for two counts
of war crimes and five counts of crimes
against humanity. This is the first warrant
of arrest issued for a sitting Head of State
by the ICC. The majority of the Chamber
declined to include charges of genocide in
the arrest warrant, based on a finding that
the material provided by the Prosecution
in support of its application for a warrant
failed to provide reasonable grounds to
believe that al-Bashir acted with specific
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Fur,
Masalit and Zaghawa groups. Judge Anita
Ušacka dissented on the issue of genocide.
The Prosecution has filed a motion with
the Pre-Trial Chamber for leave to appeal
the majority’s decision, arguing, inter alia,
the Chamber applied the wrong standard
in evaluating the Prosecution’s evidence
in support of the genocide charges. The
Chamber’s decision whether to permit the
appeal, which falls within the discretion of
the Pre-Trial Chamber, remains pending at
the time of this writing.
Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute governing the ICC, but the Security
Council vested the Court with jurisdiction
to investigate and prosecute crimes committed in the Darfur region of Sudan via
a Chapter VII resolution passed in March
2005. Since the beginning of the Court’s
work in Darfur, the Sudanese government has refused cooperation with the
ICC, including by refusing to enforce two
arrest warrants issued by the Court in July
2008 against a high-ranking minister of
the Sudanese government and the alleged
leader of the Janjaweed militia. President
al-Bashir has similarly disregarded his
own arrest warrant, travelling internationally several times since the warrant was
issued, although only to states that are not
party to the Rome Statute. Although there
is an argument that even non-ICC parties have an obligation to arrest al-Bashir
under the terms of the Security Council’s
referral of the Darfur situation to the
ICC, it is not expected that the Sudanese
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president will be apprehended any time
soon. Finally, while the Sudanese government, supported by the African Union,
China, and Russia, has requested that the
UN Security Council exercise its authority
under the Rome Statute to request that the
ICC defer proceedings against al-Bashir,
veto-wielding Security Council members
the United States and the United Kingdom
have repeatedly expressed their opposition
to such a move.

Amendment of the Charges against
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo
On 30 March 2009, the Office of the
Prosecutor issued an amended document
containing the charges in the case against
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, the only person charged by the ICC to date in connection with the situation in the Central
African Republic. Initially, the Prosecution had charged Bemba with responsibility for three charges of crimes against
humanity and five charges of war crimes
under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute,
which provides that a person will be criminally responsible for a crime if the person
“[c]ommits such a crime, whether as an

individual, jointly with another or through
another person, regardless of whether that
other person is criminally responsible.”
Following the confirmation of charges
hearing in January 2009, however, the PreTrial Chamber issued a decision adjourning the Bemba case and requesting that the
Prosecutor consider amending the charges
to include allegations that Bemba bears
responsibility for war crimes and crimes
against humanity under a theory of command or superior responsibility pursuant
to Article 28 of the Rome Statute. The
Prosecution accepted this proposed change
in its amended document containing the
charges, which alleges that Bemba bears
responsibility under either Article 25(3)(a)
or Article 28. The Defense and participating victims will have an opportunity to
respond to the revised charges before the
Pre-Trial Chamber renders a decision on
whether there are substantial grounds to
confirm the charges against Bemba. HRB
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